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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

LIFO INVENTORIES AND CORPORATE SURPLUS
ACCUMULATIONS AS AFFECTED BY INFLATION*
By
JOHN C. CHOMMIE**

Students of federal taxation would admit of a constant need for clear cut recognition of economic forces in the making of tax plociy and in the administration of
tax law. But the familar often needs review. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the extent to which the policy makers and the tax administrators have recognized a commonplace economic phenomenon, the decreased exchange value of
the dollar. For this purpose two unrelated provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
have been selected: (1) lifo inventories and (2) corporate surplus accumulations.
Both of these provisions, of course, are expressive of definite congressional
policies. How has the cyclical upswing affected their administration? Has Treasury
enforcement policy recognized the effects of inflation on taxable income? Can
the decreased exchange value of the dollar operate as a policy factor in judicial
administration of the Code? These are the general limits of our inquiry here.
LIFO INVENTORIES

In computing taxable income, firms selling tangible goods must account for
the size and value of their inventories. Under traditional accounting practice this is
done by computing the cost of goods sold. Here, perhaps, similarities end. Sound
accounting principles demand that accounting procedures, and thus inventory methods, be tailored to the firm. It is on this premise that Congress has delegated, starting with the early revenue acts, almost complete authority to the Commissioner.
Section 471, formerly Section 22 (c), provides:
"Whenever in the opinion of the Secretary or his delegate the use
of inventories is necessary In order dearly to determine the income of any
taxpayer, inventories shall be taken by such taxpayer on such basis as the
Secretary or his delegate may prescribe as conforming as nearly as may be
to the best accounting practice in the trade or business and as most dearly reflecting the income."
Under this board mandate the Service has built up elaborate regulations as
inventories are required, what they should include, and the basis for their
when
to
valuation.' With the latter we are here concerned.
In T.D. 2609, 2it was ruled that inventories could be valued at either cost or the
lower of cost or market. This ruling is recognition of conventional accounting
practice of keeping inventory balance sheet figures current during periods of price
decline. To a limited extent this view is recognition of price change. This motive,
*A paper presented to the Seminar in Law and Economics, New York University Law School,
Summer Program for Law Teachers, 1954.
**Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
1 Reg. 118, § 39. 22(c).
2 19 Treas. Dec. 401 (1917).
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however, cannot be ascribed to the ruling except in so far as it reflects the "best
accounting practice" Code directive.
In inventorying fungible goods identification is impossible. It was thus necessary for the Treasury to indulge in a familiar legal technique, a presumption. In
this case, a presumption that up to actual quantities the goods most recently purchased constitute the inventory for tax purposes. This is fifo. It is still the basic rule
for all inventories though the actual cost of identifiable goods remains a permissable alternative.
. The effect of the business cycle on fifo with the option of cost or market
can be summarized briefly. On the upswing of the cycle inventory profits are
realized and reported as taxable income. The amount of these so-called "paper
profits" will vary depending on the price margin, turnover rate and lag. On the
downswing a price decline below cost at the end of the inventory period will result in an inventory loss. Over the long run, however, these distortions of timing
tend to be ironed out. In short, from the standpoint of the business cycle, the fifo
taxpayer takes his loses and accepts the benefits of price change along with other
taxpayers generally.3
This was the case for the first twenty-five years of income taxation, a period
of congressional and administrative indifference to cyclical change in the valuing
of inventories.
Congress and Lifo.
For sometime prior to 1938, Congress was pressured for allowance of some
inventory method that would lessen the impact of price changes. The interested
taxpayers were seemingly from the leather and nonferrous metal industries because
when lifo was first adopted in the 1938 Revenue Act it was restricted to these
groups. In 1939, however, it was extended as an alternative inventory procedure to
all taxpayers.
Currently embodied in Section 472, formerly Section 22 (d) lifo has the effect
of eliminating inventory profits on the cyclical upswing. The technique, broadly,
is that the latest items produced or purchased are presumed to be first sold. In other
words, it is last in first out, lifo. Regulations, however, permit inventory increases
to be built up under either lifo, fifo or average cost procedures. 4 But valuation must
be cost, not cost or market, and once a lifo election is made it cannot be revoked
without the consent of the Commissioner.
8 Although inventory profits have been variously labeled as "paper profits", "fools profits", etc.,
it arguable that, "Even though the appreciation results from a general rise in prices, the firm is in
a preferred position as compared with others who do not hold inventory assets, who have their
assets in the form of cash or bonds, or who rely on the sale of personal services for income. An inventory profit may also result from a rise in relative prices. A firm holding an inventory, the value
of which has risen while prices of other goods have declined, has enjoyed a gain in real as well as
in money terms. These gains from either general or relative price increases may be of immediate
importance to the firm. With rising prices the current enhanced value of inventory will be considered in realistic calculations of working capital, current ratios, and net worth." Eldridge, Issues
Raised by Proposal to Grant Cost or Market Option With Lifo, 6 Natl. Tax J. 52, 56 (1953).
4 Reg. 118, § 39.22(d)-2.
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It is arguable that as originally enacted lifo was responsive to accepted accounting practices in the leather and nonferrous metal industries. As expanded in
1939, however, it constituted clear cut recognition of the force of inflation. Briefly,
the cyclical effects are these. On the upswing the lifo taxpayer, by maintaining a
low cost valuation, excludes inventory value appreciations from taxable income. On
the downswing, because he must maintain his inventory at cost and cannot markdown as is the case with fifo, he likewise excludes inventory losses from income.
In theory, over a full cycle, everything else being equal, the impact of taxes in the
aggregate would be the same whether the taxpayer was on fifo or lifo.
This is as far as Congress has gone, a permissive use of lifo upon application to the Commissioner. 5 Satisfying the requirement of "clearly reflecting the
income", it seems to be a statutory right.
The Treasury and Lifo.
Notwithstanding the extension of lifo to all taxpayers in 1939, there was no
immediate rush to adopt this method of inventory valuation. Among the reasons
that have been advanced for this are:
(1) "In the early 194 0's prevailing opinion in the accounting profession appeared to hold that lifo was suitable only for firms maintaining homogeneous inventories such as stocks of hides or metal;" 6
(2) There was an ever present uncertainity as to the relation of
the firm to the business cycle; and
(3) There was an understandable restrictive Treasury policy toward
revenue loss during a war preparation and war period.
Although a liberal Treasury decision amended the regulations in 1944, 7 the
Treasury position up to 1947 seemed to be that, "Section 22(d) (Section 472 of
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code) . . . requires the matching of specific articles of
goods on hand at the end of the year with similar articles of good on hand at
8
the beginning of the year."
This viewpoint cannot be said to be expressive of a policy looking toward the
stabilizing of business income during a sharp cyclical upswing. But as previously
5 A cloud in the sky is lifo with the option of cost or market. On this Eldridge concludes, "The
option would widen the gap between inventory procedures and the general rules for determining
taxable current income. It would mean substantial long-run losses of revenue to the Treasury, would
operate contrarily to countercyclical fiscal policy, and would intensify difficulties of tax administration and compliance. The use of lower of cost or market values is not essential to lifo procedure,
but on the contrary it seems incongruous with basic principles of that method. On balance, the
proposed amendment for the beneft of some lifo taxpayers appears to be an undesirable change in the
law." Eldridge, supra note 3, at 67.
6 Eldridge, supra note 3, at 57. Perhaps the most comprehensive empirical study of lifo is Niland
and Butter, Inventory Accounting and Policies, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1949. In Chapter IV the authors discuss in detail the factors affecting changes to lifo procedures.
7 T.D. 5407, 1944 C.B. 83, allowing lifo as to raw materials only including goods-in-process and
finished goods, expressed terms of appropriate units.
8 Barker, Practical Aspects of Inventory Problems under Current Conditions: Lifo, Involuntary
Liquidations, 10 N.Y.U. Tax Inst. 511, 517 (note 13) (1952), being a quotation from the Government brief in chief in the Hutzler case. Barker argues that the Treasury applied T.D.5407, id.,
so as to make its application complusory by requiring a "so-called specific indentificatiorq method
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indicated a restrictive Treasury policy is understandable. Traditionally, taxpayers
have shared property appreciation values when realized with the government in the
form of taxable income. Notwithstanding this reluctance of the Treasury to permit
expansion of the lifo election, criticism of this policy during a period of extreme
increases in inventory prices is not unfounded.9 It was permissive of some decidedly unhealthy economic effects. Particularly is this so with regard to corporate growth
and expansion. During this period of excess profits taxation when rates reached
to eighty-five and one-half percent, and recently to eighty-two percent, disposablk
income could possibly be insufficent to replace high cost inventories. In theory,
such high rates on inventory profits might reach the point of the corporate income
tax operating as a levy upon economic capital. Therefore, a policy restrictive of a
shift to lifo would seem, under these circumstances, to be hardly in the interests
of a healthy economy. These instances, however, may well be rare. Certainly few
firms suffered net worth decreases as a result of a war economy.
The Courts and Lifo.
In legal terms, lifo in the courts, the Tax Court, has been principally the problem of applying lifo to the retail mark-on method of inventory valuation. Under
this system, used largely by retail department stores, all inventory records are kept
in terms of retail values by departments. Closing inventory is taken by simply
computing the dollar retail value of the goods in each department and adjusting
it by marking down the markup. There is no matching of goods. Therefore, under
Treasury regulations seemingly lifo could not be applied to the retail mark-on
method of inventory valuation.
In 1941, the department store industry developed the idea of the use of an
index of department store prices. An index number then could be related to the
dollar valued inventory as outlined above and the value of the amount of the inventory appreciation determined.
The right of a department store retailer to use indexes in lifo procedure was
tested in 1947, in Hutzler Brothers Company.' 0 In this case, the taxpayer offered
indexes prepared by the National Industrial Conference Board, a private organization, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and itself." The court held (1) that the taxof classifying their inventories" if the taxpayer elected lifo as to labor and overhead and that in textiles this was impractical, and hence it was a forcing of a "hybrid method of accounting" on the

taxpayer. Id. at 515-517.
0 The Revenue Act of 1942 accorded relief to lifo taxpayers whose stocks were involuntarily
liquidated due to war conditions. These provisions have been several times amended and are now
embodied in section 1321 of the 1954 Code. They provide for tax refunds when liquidated inventories, giving rise to taxable income, are replenished at higher costs and the old cost basis is re-

stored.

10 8 T.C. 14 (1947).
11 "The construction of price indexes is, of course, a highly technical matter, involving the mathematical principles of the choice of the proper formula, the theory of sampling in order to select from
the hundreds of articles in each class a manageable number of articles to be priced, the determination of the proper weights to be employed in averaging these prices, and, in a period such as the
last seven years when many important items were unobtainable, the problem of substitution of com-
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payer had a right to use lifo and (2) that since the taxpayer had indicated a willingness to accept any index that would secure his right to lifo, his own index should
be used because it was the least objectionable to the Commissioner.
The Service's informal acquiescence was based in large measure on its ability
to secure satisfactory indexes on a nation-wide basis compiled by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. 12 These have been issued as rulings. 18
The year following the Hutzler case the Tax Court was faced with a similar
situation in Edgar A. Basse.14 In this case, the taxpayer was a retail grocery chain
with twenty-nine stores and a warehouse. His inventory was maintained about
one-third in the retail stores and two-thirds in his warehouse. He constructed his
1
own index for the warehouse goods by using twenty-seven classifications or pools. 6
He arrived at an overall average of 113.7 for 1941 expressed in terms of percent
over opening prices. This index he used also to value the overall average of the
goods in the retail stores. The Tax Court held (1) that the taxpayer's classification
was reasonable and the 113.7 index acceptable for the warehouse goods, but (2)
that it could not be used for the retail part of the inventory because of the want of
a showing of similarities in the classification. Therefore, the court reconstructed
16
the index for the taxpayer under the doctrine of Cohan v. Commissioner, finding an index of 107 for the retail store part of the inventory.
The Basse case thus extends the Hutzler doctrine "beyond the retail inventory
pricing field". 1 Together, the cases seem to have established what has come to be
called the dollar-value method of inventory valuation, a dear rejection of thL
Commissioner's insistence upon matching. The dollar-value method is dearly of
judicial development. It seems to have no counterpart in recognized business ac18
counting procedures much to the dismay of some accountants. It had its inception
in superimposing the lifo statutory provisions on the retail markup method. Further developments in this area must await administrative and judicial action.
modities. Always there is the problem of assuring accurate reporting of data, involving the choice
of reporters, and requiring a sufficiently careful description of the articles to be priced so that strict
comparability is maintained from year to year." Ferger, The Role of Economics in Federal Tax
Administration, 1 Nati. Tax J. 97, 108 (1948).
12 The story of the task of preparing the indexes for the retail department store industry is inter.
estingly told in Ferger, id., at 107-110.
18 See I.T. 3904, 1941-C.B. 18; I.T. 3927, 1942-2 C.B. 26; I.T. 3953, 1949-1 C.B. 53; I.T. 3982,
1949-2 C.B. 22; I.T. 4008, 1950-1 C.B. 26; I.T. 4036, 1950-2 C.B. 20; I.T. 4050, 1951-1 C.B. 11;
I.T. 4064, 1951-2 C.B. 15; I.T. 4084, 1952-1 C.B. 16; I.T. 4112, 1952-2 C.B. 75; Rev. Rul. 81,
1953-12 I.R.B.
14 10 T.C. 328 (1948), acq., 1951-1 C.B. 1, excepting therefrom "the index used in determining
the amount of the retail stores inventory". Accord, Sweeney & Co., 7 T.C.M. 121 (1948).
15 One of the most difficult problems in connection with compliance with lifo regulations is determining the categories in which inventory goods must be grouped. For a discussion see Welsch,
Lifo Method of Inventory Valuation, 30 Taxes 343 (1952). The Hutzler and Basse cases seem to
set no other standard than that there must be a reasonable classification of pools or groups.
16 39 F.2d 540 (C.C.A.2d, 1930).
17 Fink, Accounting Periods, Accounting Methods, and Inventories-Some Recent Cases and Points
of Current Interest, 8 N.Y.U. Tax Inst. 570, 580 (note 29) (1950), discussing the Basse case.
18 See Lang, Lifo's "Dollar Value" Inventory, 28 Taxes 471 (1950), discussing the Basse case.
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The Hutzler decision has been characterized as "no better example of the
adaptability of legal concepts to changing conditions",19 and thus as a refutation
of thee charge of technicalism often directed at the Tax Court. The ratio decidendi
of the decision, however, bears examination. The Commissioner had argued that the
taxpayer's method did "violence to the principle of annual accounting periods,
since it has the effect of postponing the profits in a high price year and absorbing
it in a subsequent period of low prices" . 2 0 This was the rationale used by the
Supreme Court in 1930, in rejecting the minimum inventory method in Lucas v.
Kansas City Structural Steel Co.2 1 The Tax Court, however, simply pointed out
that the "broad doctrine for which that case stands is no longer authoritative" in
view of the 1939 amendments permitting lifo, and unless there was some "logical
reason why the Lifo method" was not applicable to the retail mark-on method the
taxpayer was privileged to "bring itself within the terms of section 22 (d)".
This reasoning, and the subsequent decision in the Basse case, indicates a
liberal attitude in the sense that it implies a congressional intent to qualify the annualization doctrine and to generally eliminate lifo inventory profits and losses
from the concept of taxable income.
From a still further point of view the Hutzler and Basse cases could be said
to constitute a recognition of the capital nature of a lifo inventory. This, however,
is somewhat weakened by the most recent decision of the Tax Court on lifo in
Textile Apron Co., Inc.2 2 In this case, the taxpayer corporation was a successor in
a tax free reorganization to a proprietorship which had been using lifo. The Code
iequired the taxpayer to take the proprietorship basis for its opening inventory. 23
The taxpayer, however, as a corporation, had neglected to request permission to
use lifo as required by what is now Section 472 (a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code. The majority of the Tax Court felt it had no choice but to reject the taxpayer's claim of right to use lifo. The rationale was simply that it was a new tax
entity and the literal requirements of the statute had not been complied with. Judge
Murdock for a two-judge dissenting minority felt that the majority decision was
too technical and that the taxpayer should be considered as having requested and
as having received permission to use lifo.
The technical position of the majority cannot be said to constitute anything
approaching a concept of a lifo inventory as constituting a capitdl investment. The
minority view, on the other hand, seems to be more in keeping with the general
liberal attitude of the court in the Hutzler and Basse cases.
In summary, it might be observed that the extent, if any, to which these decisions recognize the cyclical upswing as an independent force in judicial policy making is highly problematical. None of the opinions explicitly indicate that inflation
19 Reeder, The Hutzler Case: Lifo and the Retail Merchant, 7 N.Y.U. Tax Inst. 74 (1949).
20 Hutzler Brothers Co., 8 T.C. 14, 29.
21 281 U.S. 264, 50 Sup. Ct. 263 (1930).
22 21 T.C. No. 17 (1953).

28 I.R.C. (1939), § 113(b) (8).
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was influential in reaching a decision. It is not suggested here that such economic
forces should or should not be so used. Whatever the policy making role of the
Tax Court, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
CORPORATE SURPLUS ACCUMULATIONS

In a period of an expanding economy, of corporate growth, symptomatic of
a cyclical upswing, corporate managers often find themselves faced with a dilemma.
On the one hand, retained corporate earnings are purchasing less and less plant
and equipment in a replacement or expansion program. On the other hand, a retention of a larger number of earned dollars to meet growth needs creates a risk
of penalty surtaxation on grounds the accumulations will not meet the test of reasonableness required by Section 102 (c) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.24

While this problem of corporate growth is one of the most common problems, it is but one of many created by Section 102. These problems have spawned
a staggering amount of literature on the subject. 25 Our concern here, however, is
quite limited. To what extent have the tax policy makers and administrators recognized the impact of inflation in the administration of Section 102? Has inflation
simply aggravated a delicate corporate management problem? Have the Treasury
and the courts recognized the economic effects of inflation and made policy decisions accordingly? Has the decreased exchange value of the dollar been instrumental in bringing about the softer provisions of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code?
Precise answers to these and related questions are out of the question. Perhaps an
examination of the evidence, however, will at least shed some light on the attitudes
of policy makers, light that will prove to be of some aid in prediction and analysis.
Because of a new congressional policy as evidenced in the 1954 Internal Revnue Code, development of the problem will be undertaken in four steps: (1) congressional policy underlying Section 102, (2) Treasury enforcement policy, (3)
current judicial administration and (4) the new congressional policy in the 1954
Code.
CongressionalPolicy Underlying Section 102.
The Revenue Act of 1938 is the source of the modern version of Section 102,
a response to a joint committee study on tax avoidance, particularly of individual
surtaxation. As thus enacted the penalty surtax is imposed on corporate income
where the corporation is "created or organized", or "formed or availed of for
the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders or
24 Sec. 102(a) imposes a surtax of twenty-seven and one-half percent on the first $100,000 of "undistributed section 102 net income", and thirty-eight and one-half percent on amounts in excess of
$100,000. This is in addition to the normal tax and normal surtax rates. Personal holding companies and Section 101 organizations are exempt. It computing the amount of the penalty tax, the
amount of the surplus is immaterial except in so far as surplus may indicate a want of a need for
further accumulations. The penalty tax is levied on the current year's undistributed earnings.
25 See bibliography, pp. 256-260, in Hall, The Taxation of Corporate Surplus Accumulations (U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1952), hereinafter cited as Hall.
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the shareholders of any other corporation through the medium of" the accumulation of corporate earnings.
As the statute requires a "purpose", the underlying criterion is subjective,
namely, the state of tht taxpayer's mind. Section 102 (c), however, presumes the
requisite intent or purpose where "earnings and profits are permitted to accumulate
beyond the reasonable needs of the business".26 This the taxpayer is permitted
to rebut by a "clear preponderance of the evidence".
As thus expressed, the section is indicative of a broad policy as respects corporate earnings to force (1) their distribution as dividends or (2) their use in the
business. Professor Hall has expressed it thusly:
"Personal surtax avoidance through thL corporate device is recognized and countenanced so27long as undistributed corporate earnings are
put to a productive use."
From 1939 to 1954 the amendments to Section 102 were either restrictive or
technical in nature. The Revenue Act of 1951, however, contained a softening
amendment that was perhaps a harbinger of things to come in 1954. Section 315
of the 1951 Act provided in Section 102(d) (1) (D) of the Code for the exclusion
of net long term capital gains from the penalty surtax. The Senate Finance Committee was responsible for this amendment and in its report explained:
"Your committee is of the opinion, however, that the problem of
avoidance of surtax by stockholders does not arise in the case of net longterm capital gains, since these gains would have been taxed at a maximum
rate of 25 percent if they hacT been realized by the stockholder directly.
Furthermore, with present high replacement costs, corporate capital gains
must be reinvested in28order to keep the corporation's business activities at
their current level."
This provision indicates quite dearly that by 1951 the decreased exchange value
of the dollar was making itself felt in the congressional chambers.
In brief summary, however, the dominant purpose of Section 102 remains,
that is, individual surtax avoidance with a recognition that a showing of legitimate
corporate needs will operate as an avoidance of the penalty imposed. These corporate needs, however, are in no way made explicit in the Code. For guidance in this
area it is thus necessary to resort to the actual administration of Section 102.
Treasury Enforcement Policy.
It is conceded that enforcement of personal surtax avoidance through the
corporate device was gen'erally ineffective prior to the Revenue Act of 1938. With
Section 102 revitalized by this legislation, however, the Service established a new
firm enforcement policy with the issuance of T.D.4914.2 9 This decision was in the
form of instructions to Service personnel, but by its release and publication, it was
26 A similar presumption exists where the corporation is a "mere holding or investment company". § 102(b) or § 533(b), 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
27
28
29

Op. cit., supra n. 25, at 11-12.
S.R. 781, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. p. 61.
1939-2 C.B. 18, amended by T.D. 5398, 1944 C.B. 194.
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intended as a public expression of policy. The outstanding feature of T.D.4914 was
the singling out of five dassts of corporations for dose scrutiny.Y0 However, from
the standpoint of establishing criteria for testing the reasonableness of corporate
accumulations precision could not be expected. The innate nature of the problem
prohibits this. Current regulations are probably as precise as can be expected. They
provide:
"An accumulation of earnings or profits (including the undistributed earnings or profits of prior years) is unreasonable if it is not required for the purposes of the business, considering all the circumstances
of the case. It is not intended, however, to prevent accumulations of surplus for the reasonable needs of the business if the purpose is not to prevent the imposition of the surtax. No attempt is h'ere made to enumerate
all the ways in which earnings or profits of a corporation may be accumulated for the reasonable needs of the business. Undistributed income is
properly accumulated if retained for working capital needed by the business; or if invested in additions to plant reasonably reauired by the
business; or if in accordance with contract obligations placed to the credit
of a sinking fund for the purpose of retiring bonds issued by the cororation. The nature of the investment of earnings or profits is immaterial
if they are not in fact needed in the business. Among other things, the
nature of the business, the financial condition of the corporation at the
close of the taxable year. and the us'e of the undistributed earnings or
profits will be considered in determining the reasonableness of the accumulations." 8 1
More indicative of Service policy is the empirical evidence. Of the groups
singled out for close examination in T.D.4914 were "corporations, a majority of
whose stock is held by a family group or other small group of individuals, or
by a trust or trusts for the benefit of such groups". Professor Hall, in his comprehensive study of Section 102, reports that his data "fully support the contention
commonly made that section 102 has been applied by the Bureau almost exclusively
to corporations very closely held". 82
80 "(1) Corporations which have not distributed at least 70 percent of their earnings as taxable dividends. (2) Corporations which have invested earnings in securities or other properties unrelated
to their normal business activities. (3) Corporations which have advanced sums to officers or shareholders in the form of loans out of undistributed profits nr surplus from which taxable dividerids
might have been declared. (4) Corporations, a majority of whose stock is held by a family group
or other small group of individuals, or by a trust or trusts for the benefit of such groups. (5) Corporations the distributions of which while exceeding 70 percent of their earnings, appear to be inadequate when considered in connection with the nature of the business or the financial position of
the corporation or corporations with accumulations of cash or other quick assets which appear to be
beyond the reasonable needs of the business." Id. at 109.
31 Reg. 118, § 39.102-3(a).
.42 Op. cit., supra n. 25 at 116. "Of 919 assessable corporate tax years, 1938-48, the number of
ind-viduals owning voting stock was available for 857. This is 93 percent of the assessable tax
years. Ownership of assessed corporations is found to be highly concentrated (percentages have been
rounded) with-79 percent of the corporations . . . having less than 5 shareholders per corporation, 14 percent of the corporations . . . having 5 to 10 shareholders per corporation, 3 percent of
the corporations . . . having 10 to 15 shareholders per corporation, 2 percent of the corporations
. ..having 15 to 25 shareholders per corporation, 0.8 percent of the corporations . . . having 25 to
50 shareholders per corporation, 0.4 percent of the corporations . . .having 50 to 100 shareholders
per corporation." Id. at 115.
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A recent survey on the economic effrcts of Section 102 indicates that there
seems to be no dispute "that the particular impact of the penalty provision is upon
closely held corporations", 88 but the same survey indicated some considerable criticism of other facets of Service policy. This collected criticism, of course, emitted
principally from corporate groups, their accountants and tax counsel. From the
standpoint of 'enforcement policy it was charged or intimated that Service personnel were guilty of such abuses as non-uniformity in administration, use of Section 102 as a threat, lack of familiarity with corporate problems, delay in final decisions and harmful publicity.3 4 Though enforcement policy was defended, the significance of this widespread criticism is revealed in the new policy embraced in the
1954 Internal Revenue Code which is discussed below.
What is significant for our purposes here, however, is that in the questionnaire
survey conducted by the Joint Committee on the Economic Report (Professor Hall's
report), only 18.3 percent of the corporations surveyed indicated adverse effects
from Section 102 as regards corporate growth.3 5 On this problem, however, perhaps the most explicit expression of Service policy is that expressed in the
above regulations that "undistributed income is properly accumulated ... if invested
in additions to plant reasonably required by the business". With regard to such
a factor as the decreased exchange value of the dollar presumably this is just one
of the "circumstances" that may be demanded by the individual case.
Current judicial Administration.
Limiting our discussion here to current judicial administration seems justified
in light of two facts (1) It has only been since the early 1940's that the cyclical
upswing has been marked. (2) The administrative and judicial lag results in current litigation reflecting mostly war and early post-war corporate profits. Further,
in examining the impact of the cyclical upswing it would seem that the most productive group of cases would be those where corporate managers have contended
that accumulations were justified in light of corporate growth plans. This is also
in keeping with our general frame of reference.
As discussed above, the underlying statutory criterion is subjective, namely,
intent or purpose to avoid personal surtaxation. The question of reasonableness,
however, is objective. As a practical matter, a decision on this issue is conclusive
notwithstanding the statutory approach.
What constitutes a reasonable accumulation of corporate profits within the
meaning of the Code is a highly factual question. This much is axiomatic. At best,
judicial administration has been able to establish only benchmarks, broad guides
rather than general rules. Specific cases have turned on such variables as the financial
8 Panel Committee, Economic Effects of Section 102 (Tax Institute, 1951)xi.

Id. at xvi, contains the references to these criticisms among others. See also, Hall, op. cit., supra
n. 25, c. III. The difficulties in enforcing a non-self-assessed penalty tax are manifest. It is clear
that Service policy must have some degree of force to carry out congressional intent, "otherwise the
penalty tax becomes an empty statutory threat". Hall, id. at 94.
84

85 Id. at 62.
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history of the corporation, the hazards and contingencies of the company, the nature
of the corporate investments, the cash balances, the quick net assets, the effect of
distribution on the shareholders' surtax, the nature of the competition, the number
of shareholders, the extent of debt and equity retirement, the state of depreciation
of fixed assets, the need for a strong business condition, the need for plant and
inventory expansion and accumulations of prior years. These, of course, are only
some of the variables.8 6 It is therefore apparent that a limited survey as here can
be but suggestive.
To state the problem broadly, given a corporate expansion program, will the
courts recognize the effects of the decreased exchange value of the dollar? 7 Perhaps
it should be noted at the outset that often a claim of an expansion program has been
rejected for want of definiteness of the plan.8 8 It is understandable that a taxpayer
caught with his corporate accumulations showing would make an attempt, through
hindsight, to show an expansion plan. This, of course, is largely a matter of proof,
a particularly important factor in this type of case.
Therefore, to further limit the problem, given a definite expansion plan,
what is probative to establish that the costs are in keeping with the accumulations?
Perhaps the case that sheds the most light on the effect of a cyclical upswing in
this area is World Publishing Co. v. United States.39 In this case, the taxpayer, a
one-man newspaper corporation, passed dividends in 1942 and 1943, during which
years it had disposable earnings of some $80,000 and $96,000. At the end of
1943, it had an earned surplus of some $740,000 and quick net assets of $670,000.
In 1941 it had established a reserve of $500,000 to pay for a new press and plant
at an estimated cost of $350,000 and $150,000 respectively. One-half of the cost
of the press was to be borne by another newspaper corporation. This left $325,000
836Professor Hall, however, has aptly stated the underlying criterion in determining reasonableness.
"In a fundamental sense, the problem of corporate liability under section 102 is a problem of
liquidity." Id. at 11. See also, id. at 16-17.
37 It should be noted that in a group of early cases (the first litigated Section 102 case was in 1930,
more than twenty years after enactment of the first penalty tax) the courts recognized the impact
of the cyclical downswing in so far as it resulted in a depreciation of the value of held securities.
In Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 58 Sup. Ct. 932 (1938) (upholding the constitutionality of the penalty surtax), it was stated: "Depreciation in any of the assets is evidence to
be considered by the Commissioner and the Board in determining the issue of fact whether the accumlation of profits was in excess of the reasonable needs of the business. But obviously depreciation . . . does not, as a matter of law, preclude a finding that the accumulation . . . was in excess
of the reasonable needs of the business." Id., 304 U.S. at 9, 58 Sup. Ct. at 937. See also Blaffer &
Co. v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 487 (C.C.A. 5th, 1939), c.d.; 308 U.S. 576, 60 Sup. Ct. 91 (1939) ;
Nipoch Corp., 36 B.T.A. 662 (1937), appeal dismissed, (C.C.A.2d, 1940); C. H. Spitzner &
Sons, Inc., 37 B.T.A. 511 (1938), non-acq., 1938-2 C.B. 58; Reynard Corp., 37 B.T.A. 552 (1938),
appeal dismissed, (C.C.A.2d, 1938).
38 See e.g. Whitney Chain & Mfg. Co., 3 T.C. 1109 (1944), affm'd., 149 F.2d 936 (C.C.A.2d,
1945); KOMA Inc. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 390 (C.C.A.10th, 1951); Twin City Theatres, 11
T.C.M. 454 (1952).
39 169 F.2d 186 (C.C.A.1oth, 1948), c.d., 335 U.S. 911, 69 Sup. Ct. 480 (1949). It should be
noted that at a directors' meeting in December, 1942, one of the tax years involved, an additional
$250,000 was set aside to meet the anticipated costs, and when the building contract was actually
let it was on a cost plus basis. For a case involving a high disparity between pre-war and post-war
inventories (Cadillacs) see Thomas S. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 12 T.C.M. 730 (1953).
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as the taxpayer's estimated obligation. The directors recognized that actual expansion could not be undertaken until the end of World War II. By 1945, however,
the estimated costs of expansion had risen from $500,000 to some $940,000 due
to inflation.
The problem in such a case is whether the taxpayer is to lye given the benefit
of hindsight in his cost estimates. The district court and the majority of the court
of appeals, along with the apparent weight of authority, denied the right of the
taxpayer to do this. The dissenting judge in the court of appeals, however, measured
the quick net assets against the 1945 estimates and thus found that the accumulations were not unreasonable.
The case contains the factor of uncertainty as to the execution of the expansion
plans, but this is not necessarily fatal to the taxpayer. The Tax Court, for example,
in The Goodman Furniture Co., 40 held accumulations for the same tax years not

unreasonable even though the same type of uncertainty existed. In this case, the
taxpayer was a family corporation engaged in the retail furniture business. Plans
for building two branch stores in residential districts had been commenced as
early as 1935, but actual purchase of one lot was not made until 1947. The Court
rationalized:
"The business of the petitioner had grown substantially since its
beginning and bona fide plans were being made during the years 1942
and 1943 for further growth. A ,part of the surplus accumulated through
earnings was being retained during those years for the purchase of land
and the erection of one or two branch stores .... That was permissible
under section 102. . . .Goodman's estimate at that time was that about

$500,000 would be needed to establish those stores. That estimate does
not appear to have been excessive. Subsequent events proved he had
underestimated the amount necessary. . . .Goodman gave satisfactory

explanations for his failure to establish a branch store between 1935,
when he first planned it, and 1947, when he first bought the site....
"Goodman believed in 1942 and 1943 that the petitioner would
enjoy a tremendous boom in sales after the war. ... Subsequent events

proved that that opinion was well founded. He estimated in 1942 and
1943 that the petitioner would need funds for larger inventories and
for the extension of credit in connection with this anticipated post-war
business. .

.

.It is not necessary to decide whether or not his estimates

for his purpose were fully justified, since his 'estimates were honest, and
substantial amounts of capital would be necessary and were necessary
when the boom developed.
"The petitioner did not have, at most, more than a few hundred
thousand dollars of capital available for other purposes when due allowance is made for the capital necessary and actually used in the operation
of the business in 1942 and 1943, and for the capital necessary for the
proposed branch store. The retention of that additional capital was justi40 11 T.C. 530 (1948), acq., 1949-1 C.B. 2, quoted from with approval in National Yarn Corp.,
9 T.C.M. 603 (1950); A. H. Phillips, Inc., 10 T.C.M. 1007 (1951); Korricks, Inc., 12 T.C.M. 327

(1953).
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which would be enfied by the boom anticipated at the end of the war
41
joyed by the existing store, despite its location."
Given a sufficient degree of certainty for the execution of a plan of expansion,
the problem in these cases seems to be one of engineering and economics, in other
words, one of estimating future costs. If the taxpayer is to be denied the right of
hindsight, which is logical enough, he faces a particularly acute problem. His tax
advisers undoubtedly now appreciate the need for expert help from the engineer,
economist and statistician and that "off-the-cuff" estimates of future costs are apt
to prove disastrous taxwise during severe cyclical changes. Unfortunately, trial and
appellate court opinions have not proved to be too helpful in this area, 42 even
though in a dictum in one case the Tax Court indicated some sympathy for bona
fide overestimates. 43 Perhaps a good deal of the needed source material for an
.empirical study in this respect lies buried in tax counsel and corporate files.
In summary, it might be said that the courts will recognize the effects of
inflation in these cases provided that facts adequate to the task are presented to
them. They will not, however, generally give the taxpayer the benefit of hindsight
on inadequately prepared cost estimates of future growth needs.
The New Congressional Policy in the 1954 Code.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 still expresses a broad congressional
policy directed against personal surtax avoidance by imposing a penalty surtax on
"accumulated taxable income" of corporations subject to the act. The same rates are
imposed by Section 531 as previously under Section 102(a). The same corpora44
tions, personal holding companies and exempt organizations, are excluded.
The significant changes are:
(1) a $60,000 "accumulated earnings credit" provided for in Section 535(c);
(2) application of the penalty tax to that part of the annual earnings unreasonably accumulated, not the entire annual accumulations;
(3) a shifting of the burden of proof in certain situations to the
Commissioner in Tax Court litigation; and
(4) an attempt to establish a new standard for determining the
"reasonable needs of the business".
41 11 T.C. at 535.
42 See e.g. the following recent taxpayer "victories" involving expansion plans of various types in

addition to those cited supra, n. 40 Little Rock Towel & Line Supply Co., 11 T.C.M. 36 (1952) ; The
Columbus Die, Tool & Machine Co., 11 T.C.M. 1053 (1952); Kimbell Milling Co., 11 T.C.M.
219 (1952); Metal Office Furniture Co., 11 T.C.M. 1066 (1952); Crawford County Printing &
Publ. Co., 17 T.C. 1404 (1952); Gazette Telegraph Co., 19 T.C. 692 (1953), acq., 4 P-H Tax
Ser. Para. 76, 874 (1954).
48 Lion Clothing Co., 8 T.C. 1181, 1190 (1947), "We have no reason to doubt the bona fides of
the estimate, considering the very large annual volume of petitioners business. Also, when reductions on credit are removed it would be necessary to increase the size of its accounts receivable.
Petitioner estimates that $50,000 will be required for this purpose. Thus it will be seen that substantial amounts of cash will be necessary even though it may turn out that petitioner has over-estimated them."
44 The House provision for excluding "public" corporations with 1500 or more shareholders was

eliminated in the Senate, and the House receded.
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The last two changes merit some additional comment here. Section 533 (a) of
the new Code corresponds to Section 102 (c) of the 1939 Code. Unreasonable
accumulations are prima facie determinative of an intent to avoid personal surtaxation. Rebuttal now may be by a "preponderance" rather than by a "clear
preponderance of the evidence". More significant, however, is new Section 534
which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. In substance, if the Commissioner gives the taxpayer notice, in advance of a deficiency
assessment, of an intent to assess the penalty tax and the taxpayer fails to respond
within thirty days of the Commissioner's mailing or responds inadequately with
a statement of his position as to the reasonableness of the accumulations, then the
burden remains with the taxpayer. If the Commissioner fails to send the requisite
notice or the taxpayer responds adequately, the burden of proof is on the Commissioner.
It seems clear that this burden of proof provision is responsive to the widespread complaints discussed above in connection with Treasury45 enforcement policy.
This is borne out by the Ways and Means Committee Report.
It should be noted that the burden of proof provision of Section 534 applies
not only to the question of reasonableness but also to the extent to which the earnings exceed the reasonable needs of the business.
Section 537 of the new Code provides simply that "for purposes of this
part, the term 'reasonable needs of the business' includes the reasonably anticipated
needs of the business." This section was added in the Senate Finance Committee
but was a technical redrafting of the accumulated earnings provisions contained in
H.R.8300. The Ways and Means Committee Report explains this "new" standard thusly:
"In order to eliminate the immediacy test, your committee has expressly provided in the statute that the reasonable needs of the business
shall indude the 'reasonably anticipated' needs of the business. It is contemplated that this amendment will cover the case where the taxpayer has
specific and definite plans for acquisition of buildings or equipment for
use in the business. It would not apply where the future plans are vague
and indefinite, or where execution of the plans is postponed indefinitely.
"The criticism has also been made that, in determining the reasonable needs of the business, consideration has been frequently given to
events occurring after the dose of the taxable year. Your committee is of
the opinion that only the facts as of the close of the taxable year should be
taken into account in determining whether an accumulation is reasonable.
If the retention of earnings is justified as of the close of the taxable year,
subsequent events should not be used for the purpose of showing that the
retention was unreasonable in such year. However, subsequent events
may be considered to determine whether the employee (taxpayer) has
45 H.R. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 52.
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actually consummated the plans for which the earnings were accumulated."46

The report refers to situations where subsequent events might operate against
the taxpayer. Presumably the converse was also intended. If so, the explanation is
significant in light of the discussion above concerning the World PublishingCompany case and the use of hindsight in establishing estimated costs of growth plans.
While the new legislation as a whole is highly favorable to the taxpayer, in situations where he still has the burden of proof, the problem of estimating costs is as
critical, if not more so, than ever.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The changes in relative economic position brought about by cyclical forces are
readily apparent. It is understandable that corporate managers should take steps to
take advantage of this economic phenomenon for the benefit of the individual firm.
This is reflected in the Code lifo provisions brought about by a small pressure group
and followed by what might be termed an equitable expansion to all taxpayers.
The result of these changes permitting huge tax savings was bound to cause reaction. We see this in a restrictive Treasury policy toward changing from fifo to
lifo. This policy may be justified in the interest the Treasury has in protecting
the public revenue and, perhaps, in executing countercyclical fiscal policy. In resisting change, the Treasury drew on its traditional power over accounting procedures and inventories. In choosing between the Commissioner's broad power and
the lifo provisions, however, there is no empirical evidence that the courts have
been influenced by the cyclical upswing of the past two decades. The taxpayer has
been favored not on economic grounds but on a basis of a liberal statutory interpretation. The result of these victories for the taxpayer has been a cutting down
of some of the Commissioner's traditional power over accounting procedures. They
have also had a considerable impact on traditional inventory accounting methods
with the establishment of the dollar-value method of inventory valuation.
The cyclical effects on the administration of the penalty surtax on unreasonable
corporate accumulations are more inconclusive. Prior to the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 it might be said that both Congress and the Treasury
had maintained a position of neutrality. This has also been the role of the courts
in rule making. In estimating costs of future expansion plans, however, the courts
have fairly well marked out the task for the taxpayer. Finally, thle new Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 seems to spell out a new liberal policy with respect to
accumulations for future growth, but without, however, 'eliminating the necessity
for a fair degree of precision in estimating future costs. This is the job tax counsel
faces, a job often calling for the expert help of the engineer and the economist.
46 Id. at 53. The influence of the American Bar Association in the formulating of the new congressional policy is quite evident. Compare §§ 531-537 of the new Code with the statement of
William J. Duiker, op. cit., supra n. 33, at 197-203.

